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Abstract.  This paper develops an understanding of creativity to meet the requirements of the 
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Feist v. Rural (1991). The inclusion of 
creativity in originality, in a minimal degree of creativity, and in a creative spark below the 
level required for originality, is first established.  Conditions for creativity are simultaneously 
derived.  Clauses negatively implying creativity are then identified and considered.  
 
The clauses which imply creativity can be extensively correlated with conceptions of 
computability.  The negative of creativity is then understood as an automatic mechanical or 
computational procedure or a so routine process which results in a highly routine product.  
Conversely, creativity invariantly involves a not mechanical procedure.  The not mechanical is 
then populated by meaning, in accord with accepted distinctions, drawing on a range of 
discourses.  Meaning is understood as a different level of analysis to the syntactic or 
mechanical and also as involving direct human engagement with meaning.  As direct 
engagement with meaning, it can be connected to classic concepts of creativity, through the 
association of dissimilars.  Creativity is finally understood as not mechanical human activity 
above a certain level of routinicity. 
 
Creativity is then integrated with a minimal degree of creativity and with originality.  The level 
of creativity required for a minimal degree is identified as intellectual.  The combination of an 
intellectual level with a sufficient amount of creativity can be read from the exchange values 
connected with the product of creative activity.  Humanly created bibliographic records and 
indexes are then possible correlates to or constituents of a minimal degree of creativity.  A four 
stage discriminatory process for determining originality is then specified. 
 
Finally, the strength and value of the argument are considered. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Creativity has been discerned as highly significant and fundamental to the seminal 
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Feist v. Rural, which affirmed 
originality and a minimal degree of creativity as essential for copyrightability in 
compilations (Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service Co., Inc., 1991).  An 
understanding of creativity, applicable to the decision, has defied explicit development in 
the now more than twenty years since the publication of the decision (Clifford, 2004; 
Ginsburg, 1992; Greetham, 1996; Narayanan, 1993-1994; Nimmer, 2001; Nimmer and 
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Nimmer, 1978-2010; Polivy, 1997-1998; Raskind, 1991–1992; Resnik, 2003; Strong, 
1994; Trosow, 2004-2005, p.109; VerSteeg, 1995, 2007).  The decision implies an 
understanding for creativity by clauses with an antithetical character, most significantly 
by ‘so mechanical or routine as to require no creativity whatsoever’ (Feist Publications, 
Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service Co., Inc., 1991, p.362), which would imply creativity as neither 
so mechanical nor so … routine.  The purpose of this paper is to develop an explicit 
understanding of creativity, from those clauses, which fully meets the requirements of the 
decision. 
 
The topic will be approached progressively.  The relation of creativity to originality and 
to a minimal degree of creativity will first be established, as the precise sense in which 
creativity is both significant and fundamental has not been fully articulated.  Conditions 
for creativity and a minimal degree of creativity will be simultaneously derived from the 
decision.  Next, an understanding of creativity will be generated from the antithetical 
clauses which negatively imply it and the understanding will be substantiated and 
developed.  Creativity, as understood, will then be reintegrated with a minimal degree of 
creativity and originality.  Finally, we will conclude with a reflection on the strength of 
the argument.  All readings of both the semantics and grammar of the decision are 
ordinary language, unless otherwise indicated. 
 
We can begin with creativity in the decision. 
 
Creativity in Feist 
 
Originality is required for all works. 
 
‘a compilation, like any other work, is copyrightable only if it satisfies the originality 
requirement … the originality requirement applies to all works’ (Feist Publications, Inc. v. 
Rural Tel. Service Co., Inc., 1991, p.357) [emphases added]. 
 
A statement specifying what original means is given once, and only once, within the 
opinion.  As a unique occurrence, the statement must be received as exhaustive of the 
meaning of original. 
 
‘Original, as the term is used in copyright, means only that the work was independently created 
by the author (as opposed to copied from other works), and that it possesses at least some 
minimal degree of creativity.’ (Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service Co., Inc., 1991, 
p.345)  
 
The qualification immediately following ‘[o]riginal’, ‘as the term is used in copyright’, 
indicates a meaning specific to copyright.  ‘[O]nly’ in ‘means only’ (p.345) must be read 
rigorously as, entirely restricted to.  The ‘and’ (p.345) connecting ‘independently created’ 
(p.345) and ‘at least some minimal degree of creativity’ (p.345) indicates that both 
independent creation and at least some minimal degree of creativity are essential to 
originality.  The meaning of original is, then, specific to copyright, but not technical, and 
can then be understood as a more precise instantiation of an ordinary discourse sense, 
consistently with the need to be applicable to all works.  ‘[A]t least’ in ‘at least some 
minimal degree of creativity’ (p.345) indicates a lower threshold for a minimal degree of 
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creativity.  Crucially, originality is solely constituted by independent creation and at least 
some minimal degree of creativity (see Figure 1).  <Insert Figure 1 here > 
 
Independent creation is parenthetically explicated, at its introduction. 
 
 ‘the work was independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other works)’ 
(Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service Co., Inc., 1991, p.345)  
 
Creativity is not directly included in any of the formulations for independent creation (see 
Figure 2).  <Insert Figure 2 here > 
 
‘[A]t least some minimal degree of creativity’ (Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. 
Service Co., Inc., 1991, p.345) would include a minimal degree of creativity.  A minimal 
degree of creativity disaggregates into a required level and sufficient amount.  
 
‘some minimal degree of creativity.  To be sure, the requisite level of creativity is extremely low; 
even a slight amount will suffice.’ (Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service Co., Inc., 1991, 
p.345) [citations omitted]. 
 
A minimal degree of creativity is then, firstly, constituted by a required level of 
creativity, and, secondarily, by an amount of creativity at that level.  The level of 
creativity required must be knowable, from its explicit specification as one of the 
requirements of a test for originality. 
 
‘Originality requires … that the author make the selection or arrangement independently … 
and that it display some minimal level of creativity. Presumably, the vast majority of 
compilations will pass this test.’ (Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service Co., Inc., 1991, 
pp.358-359)  
 
The combination of level and amount for a minimal degree of creativity should also be 
discernible, to fulfill the requirements of the test.  The further references which can be 
assimilated to a minimal degree of creativity and which include the words creativity and 
creative link them only to terms which can be understood as corresponding to ‘minimal 
degree’, such as ‘modicum’, ‘component’, or ‘minimal spark’ (Feist Publications, Inc. v. 
Rural Tel. Service Co., Inc., 1991, pp.345, 346, 362, 363) (see Figure 3) <Insert Figure 3 
here >.  Creativity and creative are not then further explicated or linked to semantically 
similar terms, within the references to a minimal degree of creativity.  The different 
terms, creativity and creative, are revealed, on inspection, to be equivalent in their 
inclusion of creativity
1
 but the predominance of creativity (five as contrasted with three 
mentions) implies a concern with the substantive phenomenon of creativity.   
 
Creativity would then be included in a minimal degree of creativity and would also be a 
mediated constituent of originality, from the inclusion of a minimal degree of creativity 
within originality (see Figure 4) <Insert Figure 4 here >.  From its inclusion in a minimal 
degree of creativity, creativity must give rise to level and to level and amount in 
combination.  It must also be sufficiently knowable to be incorporated into the possibility 
of obtaining knowledge of the level of creativity required for a minimal degree of 
creativity.  From its inclusion within originality, it must be applicable to all works.  Such 
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works would exhibit very high and historically rare levels of creativity and creativity 
must then also comprehend a range from the minimal to the very highest level.   
 
A creative spark below the level required for originality is distinguished (see Figure 5) 
<Insert Figure 5 here>. 
 
‘There remains a narrow category of works in which the creative spark is utterly lacking or so 
trivial as to be virtually nonexistent. … Such works are incapable of sustaining a valid 
copyright.’ (Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service Co., Inc., 1991, p.359)  
 
‘There remains’ (p.359) indicates that the creative spark ‘so trivial as to be virtually 
nonexistent’ begins immediately after a minimal degree of creativity, without a 
significant interval.  The extended characterization of below the required level of 
creativity in selection, coordination, and arrangement (Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural 
Tel. Service Co., Inc., 1991, pp.362-363), forms the basis for the conclusion that, ‘the 
names, towns, and telephone numbers copied by Feist were not original to Rural’ (p.362).  
The characterization constitutes the strongly predominant part of a passage immediately 
preceding the conclusion to the opinion, from [t]he question remains’ (p.362) to ‘[w]e 
conclude that’ (p.363).  It can then be understood as highly significant, technically as the 
ratio decidendi, or rationale for the decision, as its crux or crucial turning point.  
 
The ‘creative spark’ (Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service Co., Inc., 1991, p.359) 
below the level of creativity required for originality contains a further distinction.  The 
creative spark ‘so trivial as to be virtually nonexistent’ (p.359) can be differentiated from 
the creative spark ‘utterly lacking’ (p.359) (see Figure 6) <Insert Figure 6 here >.  The 
creative spark ‘so trivial as to be virtually nonexistent’ (p.359) can be understood as a 
real level and amount of creativity and would include creativity.  The creative spark 
‘utterly lacking’ (p.359), by contrast, would exclude creativity in a positive sense.  
Creativity as included in and as excluded from the creative spark can be understood as 
identical with each other.  The concern with the substantive phenomenon of creativity 
established for a minimal degree of creativity is sustained
2
.   
 
The clauses corresponding to ‘utterly lacking’ (p.359) form the thematically and 
quantitatively, understood as the number of references, dominant part of the creative 
spark below the level of creativity required for originality (see Figure 6).  They are then 
the major part of the most significant component of the judgment.   
 
The clauses can be read to imply, as well as to exclude, creativity (see Figure 7) <Insert 
Figure 7 here >.  ‘[U]tterly lacking’ (Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service Co., 
Inc., 1991, p.359) can be read to imply, creativity fully present, as its antithesis or 
complement.  ‘[N]o creativity whatsoever’ (p.362) implies some creativity at all, as its 
own antithesis.  It then indicates an immediate transition from the absence of creativity to 
creativity.  The clause also explicitly includes the absence of creativity—‘no creativity’ 
(p.362)—which had been strongly implied by, ‘utterly lacking’ (p.359).  ‘[D]evoid of 
even the slightest trace of creativity’ (p.362) implies, with the slightest trace of creativity.  
It can then be similarly understood to ‘no creativity whatsoever’ (p.362) as indicating an 
immediate transition from the absence of creativity to creativity.  The reference to a 
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product in ‘end product … devoid of even the slightest trace of creativity’ (p.362) adds 
the significant possibility of reading the absence of creativity from the product, from the 
‘trace’ left by processes of selection, coordination, and arrangement.  The consecutive 
clauses are then mutually complementary.  The final clause, ‘nothing remotely creative’ 
(p.363) implies creativity as remote from its own antithesis, as something fully creative.  
The initial clause and its implication, of creativity fully present, then comprehends all the 
subsequent clauses and their implications of, some creativity at all, with the slightest 
trace of creativity, and something fully creative.   
 
Combining the references to the minimal degree of creativity required for originality and 
to the creative spark below the requisite level of creativity is informative (see Figure 8) 
<Insert Figure 8 here >.  The clause, ‘more than a de minimis quantum of creativity’ 
(p.363) can be read as a whole to refer to a minimal degree of creativity, and a part of it, 
‘a de minimis quantum’ (p.363), to correspond to the creative spark ‘so trivial as to be 
virtually nonexistent’ (p.359), with ‘creativity’ (p.359) as a common term. The strongly 
implied equivalence between creativity in a minimal degree of creativity and in the 
‘creative spark … so trivial as to be virtually nonexistent’ (Feist Publications, Inc. v. 
Rural Tel. Service Co., Inc., 1991, p.359) is, then, confirmed.  The totality of the 
combined references includes all instances of the terms creativity and creative, in the 
direct text of the decision (see Figure 8).  The references are thereby exhaustive of 
creativity, for the purposes of the decision.   
 
The treatment of creativity, within the exhaustive set of references, contrasts significantly 
with other aspects of the decision.  Creativity is nowhere assigned a meaning specific to 
copyright, unlike originality, and nor is it explicated, unlike independent creation.  It must 
then be understood to default to consistency with ordinary discourse.  Creativity is not 
disaggregated, in contrast to a minimal degree of creativity.  It is not connected to 
semantically similar or overlapping terms, contrasting with other parts of the judgment, 
such as the characterization of the absence of creativity, as ‘an age-old practice, firmly 
rooted in tradition and so commonplace that it has come to be expected as a matter of 
course’ (Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service Co., Inc., 1991, p.363).  An 
understanding of creativity cannot then be obtained by referral to subordinate or related 
terms.  The implication of creativity from the ‘creative spark … utterly lacking’ (p.359) 
then emerges as the only means for generating an understanding of creativity, from 
within the decision. 
 
The conditions derived for creativity from its inclusion in a minimal degree of creativity, 
in originality, and the creative spark ‘so trivial as to be virtually nonexistent’ (Feist 
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service Co., Inc., 1991, p.359), can be combined.  
Creativity must occupy the level ‘so trivial as to be virtually nonexistent’ (p.359), the 
‘extremely low’ level required for a minimal degree of creativity, and the highest possible 
level.  It should be knowable, applicable to all works, and consistent with ordinary 
discourse.   
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Clauses implying creativity  
 
The common lack of copyrightability for the creative spark ‘utterly lacking’ and ‘so 
trivial as to be virtually nonexistent’ (Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service 
Co., Inc., 1991, p.359) legitimates consideration of the substantive terms of their 
characterization in selection, coordination, and arrangement as a whole. 
 
‘so mechanical or routine’ 
‘entirely typical … garden-variety … end product’  
‘could not be more obvious . . . the most basic information’ 
‘dictated by state law’ 
‘an age-old practice, firmly rooted in tradition and so commonplace that it has come to be 
expected as a matter of course … practically inevitable … time-honored tradition’ 
(Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service Co., Inc., 1991, pp.362–363) 
 
‘[S]o mechanical’ obtains priority from its initial position.  ‘[M]echanical’ and all the 
other constituent terms of the characterization can all be understood in their central 
ordinary discourse senses (Warner, 2010a).  The overall effect of the meanings of the 
substantive terms delineating the creative spark without the level of creativity required 
for copyrightability, is analogous to a concept of compelling modern significance, to 
computability.   
 
‘It seems that this importance [of Turing's computability] is largely due to the fact that with 
this concept one has for the first time succeeded in giving an absolute definition of an 
interesting epistemological notion, i.e., one not depending on the formalism chosen.  In all 
other cases treated previously, such as demonstrability or definability, one has been able to 
define them only relative to a given language, and for each individual language it is clear that 
the one thus obtained is not the one looked for.’ (Gödel, 1946/2004, p.84). 
 
The analogy rests primarily on an overall, or gestalt, effect of correspondence (Warner, 
2010b, p.2326). 
 
The analogy gives a basis for a highly specific and definite correlation.  ‘[M]echanical’ in 
‘so mechanical’ (Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service Co., Inc., 1991, p.362) 
correlates with mechanical in a mechanical procedure, a classic term closely equivalent in 
scope to algorithm.  The correlation rests on an identity in expression, on the common 
derivation of mechanical from ordinary discourse, the adoption and retention of the 
ordinary discourse meaning, which includes both a human acting mechanically and the 
operations of a machine, the implication of an activity or process, and invocation of the 
process by denotation (Warner, 2010b, pp.2327-2328).  ‘[S]o’ in ‘so mechanical’ confers 
intensity upon ‘mechanical’.  The intensity is supported and confirmed by the 
connotations of the subsequent clause, ‘dictated by … law’ (Feist Publications, Inc. v. 
Rural Tel. Service Co., Inc., 1991, p.362).  ‘[S]o mechanical’, as a whole, can then be 
correlated with the absolute or most intense form of the computational process, with an 
automatic mechanical procedure.  The sequence of clauses with a historical resonance—
‘an age-old practice, firmly rooted in tradition and so commonplace that it has come to be 
expected as a matter of course … practically inevitable … time-honored tradition’ (Feist 
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service Co., Inc., 1991, pp.362-363)—also correlates with 
the absolute and the natural in the theory of computability, which is primarily concerned 
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with automatic processes, reinforcing the correlation (Warner, 2010b, pp.2328-2330).  
The correlation of ‘so mechanical’ (p.352) with an automatic mechanical procedure has 
been regarded as proven beyond reasonable doubt (Warner, 2010b, p.2334).  The 
correlation and its directly supporting elements exist exclusively within the clauses 
corresponding to the ‘creative spark … utterly lacking’ (Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural 
Tel. Service Co., Inc., 1991, p.359).  
 
The correlation can be held in mind while a full account of creativity ‘utterly lacking’ 
(Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service Co., Inc., 1991, p.359) is derived from the 
decision.  The majority of the substantive terms within the delineation of creativity utterly 
lacking qualify processes and are extensive in number and scope. 
 
‘so mechanical or routine’ 
‘dictated by state law’ 
‘an age-old practice, firmly rooted in tradition and so commonplace that it has come to be 
expected as a matter of course … practically inevitable … time-honored tradition’ 
(Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service Co., Inc., 1991, pp.362–363) 
 
The verbal ‘or’ linking ‘so mechanical’ with ‘routine’ can be read as a Boolean or logical 
OR, as so mechanical OR so … routine.  The reading also applies to the clauses as a 
whole, when the sense of the other terms is subsumed, for analytical purposes, under ‘so 
mechanical or routine’ (Warner, 2010a, pp.823-830).  A product is explicitly designated 
as that from which the absence of creativity can be read, as an ‘entirely typical … garden-
variety … end product, devoid of even the slightest trace of creativity’ (Feist 
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service Co., Inc., 1991, p.362).  Creativity can then be 
understood to reside in processes but to be embodied in, and readable from, a product, 
corresponding to a logical AND relation.  An understanding of creativity utterly lacking 
can then be formulated. 
 
A compilation has not the slightest trace of creativity if, and only if, it is an entirely typical or 
garden-variety end product constructed by a so mechanical or so … routine process. 
 
The formulation for the antithesis to creativity explicitly incorporates the meaning of the 
two related clauses, of ‘so mechanical or routine as to require no creativity whatsoever’ 
(p.362) and of an ‘end product … devoid of even the slightest trace of creativity’ (p.363), 
and then applies, in the first instance, to those clauses, but should be consistent with the 
further clause, ‘nothing remotely creative’ (p.363), from the potential subsuming of the 
meaning of its connected substantive terms within the scope of ‘so mechanical or routine’ 
(Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service Co., Inc., 1991, p.362; Warner, 2010a, 
p.826).  The reading of the relation between the absence of creativity for compilations 
and the substantive terms of the characterization as, if, and only, if, is justified by the 
comprehensive capturing of all the delineated elements within the antithesis to creativity, 
within a set of references identified as exhaustive of creativity.  The qualification of a 
process by ‘so mechanical or routine’ (Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service Co., 
Inc., 1991, p.362) is raised to an explicit designation in the formulation, as, a so 
mechanical or routine process.   
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The correlation can now be recalled and automatic mechanical procedure substituted for 
‘so mechanical’ (Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service Co., Inc., 1991, p.362), in 
the formulation for the antithesis to creativity. 
 
A compilation has not the slightest trace of creativity if, and only if, it is an entirely typical or 
garden-variety end product constructed by an automatic mechanical procedure or so … routine 
process. 
 
The substitution of correlated external standard adds a strongly intersubjective element to 
the formulation, in a classic process of legal advance (Holmes, 1881/1991, pp.110-111). 
 
The implication of creativity and creativity 
 
We can then transform the statement of the antithesis to creativity, by the negation of the 
clauses connected by, if, and only, if, to yield a positive statement of creativity. 
 
A compilation has the slightest trace of creativity if, and only if, it is not an entirely typical or 
garden-variety end product constructed by an automatic mechanical procedure or a so … 
routine process. 
 
The use of negation to derive the positive statement of creativity is legitimated by the 
antithetical character of ‘utterly lacking’ (Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service 
Co., Inc., 1991, p.359) and by the specific implications of the two clauses incorporated 
directly into the formulation, by some creativity at all as implied by ‘no creativity 
whatsoever’ (p.362) and an end product with the slightest trace of creativity implied by 
an ‘end product … devoid of even the slightest trace of creativity’ (p.362).  Negation is 
also a widely accepted and deeply historically rooted technique of verbal and then more 
formally logical reasoning (Bochenski, 1961; Kneale and Kneale, 1962).  In this instance, 
it is also compellingly simple.  
 
A comprehensive collection of all the possible combinations for creativity can be 
displayed with a vertical ordering corresponding to the relative significance of elements 
to the opinion, descending from ‘so mechanical’ (Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. 
Service Co., Inc., 1991, p.362) or an automatic mechanical procedure to ‘garden-variety’ 
(p.362) (see Table 1) <Insert Table 1 here >, to reveal the overall distribution of the 
creative and the not-creative.  The creative is concentrated in a major sequence of five 
rows at the head of the table, followed by a block of the not creative interrupted by two 
combinations for the creative.  Creativity and the not-creative are then generally well 
separated from each other and strongly internally grouped, suggestive of the robustness 
and plausibility of the analysis. 
 
The two interleaved combinations for the creative constitute exceptions to the overall 
pattern of distribution and could disturb the robustness of the analysis.  The first 
encountered, on a downward reading of the table, is where an automatic mechanical 
procedure is used to construct an end product which is not entirely typical or garden-
variety.  The automatic mechanical procedure is not ‘so … routine’ (Feist Publications, 
Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service Co., Inc., 1991, p.362), which could be novel or rarely used.  It 
would then still be closely proximate to the non-mechanical activity normally involved in 
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the production of significant automatic mechanical procedures.  The combination can 
then be regarded as analogous to the highest placed combination for the creative, from 
which it differs by the one element of ‘so mechanical’ (p.362), and regarded as 
substantively involving a not automatic mechanical procedure.  The next met embodies a 
tension between a so mechanical and highly routine process and the absence of routinicity 
from the product.  It could then be understood as formally possible and combinatorially 
produced but a priori unlikely. The possibility of disturbance to the analysis can then be 
reduced, both from the analogy of the first interleaved combination with an instance of 
the creative within the overall pattern and by recognizing the unlikely character of the 
second combination. 
 
The possibility of further reduction of the formulation for creativity, to obtain a simpler 
or sharper differentiation of the creative from the not creative, can be pursued.  The 
classic approach would be to be to search for a single element, from an automatic 
mechanical procedure, ‘so … routine’, ‘entirely typical’, or ‘garden-variety’ (Feist 
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service Co., Inc., 1991, pp.362-363), or a subset of those 
elements, to discriminate the outcomes, the creative and the not creative, from each other.  
No single element or subset of elements discriminates in this way, even when the 
interleaved combinations are, respectively, assimilated and excluded.  A simpler or 
sharper conception of creativity cannot then be obtained by further formal 
transformations on the identified elements. 
 
The elements which constitute the creative can themselves be considered.  The creative in 
the major sequence is both not ‘so … routine’ and ‘so … routine’, not ‘entirely typical’ 
and ‘entirely typical’, not ‘garden-variety’ and ‘garden variety’ (Feist Publications, Inc. v. 
Rural Tel. Service Co., Inc., 1991, p.362), but invariantly not an automatic mechanical 
procedure (see Table 1).  The only invariant element then is a not automatic mechanical 
procedure.  The interleaved combinations can be brought into accord with this invariance, 
in contrasting ways: the first, understood as substantively involving a not automatic 
mechanical procedure, can be positively assimilated; the second, fully mechanical but 
identified as unlikely, can, provisionally, be discounted.  An automatic mechanical 
procedure also characterizes some combinations for the not creative, as the impossibility 
of further reduction by formal transformations had implied.  It must then be understood as 
invariant within, although not distinctive of, creativity. 
 
For further substantiating and developing creativity, then, we can focus on the not 
mechanical. 
 
The not mechanical and meaning 
 
The not mechanical can be populated, from an established antithesis to an automatic 
mechanical procedure, specifically a contrast with meaning.   
 
Classic, although rather neglected, discussions of models of the theory of computability 
and models of the computational process have explicitly registered the exclusion of 
meaning from the models.  The logician, Kurt Gödel, developed a distinction of 
mechanical processes from meaning. 
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‘in the proofs we make use of insights, into these mental constructs, that spring not from the 
combinatorial (spatiotemporal) properties of the sign combinations representing the proofs 
[which are employed in mechanical procedures], but only from their meaning.’ (Gödel, 
1958/1990, p.241) [emphasis in original] 
 
The emphasis–‘meaning’–is indicative of the significance attached to meaning as 
contrasting with the ‘combinatorial (spatiotemporal) properties of the sign’ (Gödel, 
1958/1990, p.241) fundamental to mechanically conducted proofs.  Gödel reiterates the 
contrast in a subsequent publication, which refers to and cites the previous paper. 
 
‘the question of whether there exist finite non-mechanical procedures not equivalent with any 
algorithm, has nothing whatsoever to do with the adequacy of any definition of ‘formal system’ 
and of ‘mechanical procedure’. … such as those which involve the use of abstract terms on the 
basis of their meaning.’ (Gödel, 1964/2004, p.72). [emphasis in original] 
 
A correspondence between non-mechanical procedures and the use of terms on the basis 
of their meaning is indicated.  The emphasis, here given to ‘non-mechanical’ (Gödel, 
1964/2004, p.72), indicates the intensity of the contrast between the mechanical and 
meaning.  The exclusion of meaning from a mechanical procedure or algorithm, from the 
automatic computational process, would be generally accepted, if seldom emphasized, by 
relevant scholarly communities. 
 
The population of the non-mechanical by meaning can be confirmed and reinforced by 
replacing the classic term, mechanical, with an alternative, and now widely accepted, 
term, which has a highly similar, if not identical scope, in a computational context, with 
syntactic. 
 
‘in the realm of formal systems … the intuitive notion of ‘effective process’ [can be identified 
with] with the purely syntactic idea of string processing.’ (Rosen, 1995, p.529) 
 
Syntactic is embedded in a different set of contrasts and its customary complement or 
opposite would be semantic, corresponding to Gödel’s ‘meaning’.  Semantic would also 
normally be contrasted immediately with syntactic, in the sense that an intervening 
territory or intellectual space is not conceived.  The distinction between syntactic and 
semantic is embedded in ordinary discourse, adding wider diffusion, and the implication 
of the robustness needed to survive wider diffusion, to Gödel’s more deliberate 
theoretically formulated contrast between mechanical procedures and meaning. 
 
A distinction of syntax from semantics was also made in a well known and seminal 
critique of strong artificial intelligence (Searle, 1980).  Formal symbol manipulations 
have a syntax but not a semantics and intelligence could not then be attributed to 
computers (Searle, 1980).  The impact of the critique, as revealed in its subsequent 
reception, may be partly derived from its resonance with the ordinary discourse 
distinction of syntax from semantics. 
 
The field of information theory, which has some analogies with the theory of 
computability, through its modeling of an information technology process, although of 
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signal transmission rather than of computation, also excludes meaning from direct 
consideration, as a founding assumption. 
 
‘The fundamental problem of communication is that of reproducing at one point either exactly 
or approximately a message selected at another point. Frequently the messages have meaning; 
that is they refer to or are correlated according to some system with certain physical or 
conceptual entities. These semantic aspects of communication are irrelevant to the engineering 
problem.’ (Shannon, 1948/1993, p.5) [emphasis in original] 
 
The emphasis given to meaning indicates the significance of its exclusion and ‘meaning’ 
is directly correlated with ‘semantic’ (Shannon, 1948/1993, p.5).  In a later exposition of 
information theory, intended for wider public dissemination, the exclusion of meaning is 
reiterated. 
 
‘Before we can consider how information is to be measured it is necessary to clarify the precise 
meaning of ‘information’ from the point of view of the communication engineer. … In any 
case, meaning is quite irrelevant to the problem of transmitting the information.’ (Shannon, 
1968/1993, pp.213-214) 
 
The exclusion of meaning is again introduced as a founding, and preliminary, 
assumption.  The exclusion of meaning from considerations of signal transmission in 
information theory corresponds to the contrast of mechanical procedures with meaning in 
computability, supporting the significance and fundamental nature of the distinction. 
 
Meaning also has a specific application to compilations.  The fundamental aim for 
compilations, across a historically and synchronically wide range of compilations, has 
been conceived as collocating common or related meanings, irrespective of their 
particular form of expression in the language of discourse.  The involvement of meaning 
then includes a central form of activity for compilations.   
 
The population of the not mechanical by meaning can admit the assimilation of the first 
interleaved combination for creativity to the major sequence.  Activity in the construction 
of a mechanical procedure has been understood as human activity on meaning 
(Weizenbaum, 1976/1984).  The first interleaved combination, in which creativity is 
immediately connected with a mechanical procedure but was revealed to have a deeper 
and substantive connection with non-mechanical activity, then also involves activity on 
meaning.  It can then continue to be assimilated to the major sequence.   
 
In summary and synthesis, then, meaning is understood as contrasting with the 
mechanical in a number of partly independent, although also interconnected, domains, in 
the theory of computability, ordinary discourse, a critique of artificial intelligence, and 
information theory.  The contrast of syntax with semantics is conceived as fundamental, 
significant, and intense and as immediate, without intervening territory.  We therefore 
have very strong warrant for taking meaning as the immediate population of the not 
mechanical.  
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Meaning and direct engagement with meaning 
 
A dual sense of meaning can be detected in its contrast with the mechanical.  Explicitly, it 
is largely conceived as a different level of analysis, in accord with a familiar distinction 
inherited from historically embedded modes of thought.  Implicitly, and emerging, it has 
also been understood as direct engagement with meaning. 
 
Some of the sources indicate or imply a conception of meaning as connected with direct 
human activity.  Meaning in the sense in which it is used by Gödel—‘insights … only 
from their meaning’ (Gödel, 1958/1990, p.241), and, ‘the use of abstract terms on the 
basis of their meaning’(Gödel, 1964/2004, p.72)—implies, particularly by ‘insights’ 
(Gödel, 1958/1990, p.241) and ‘use’ (Gödel, 1964/2004, p.72), direct human engagement 
with meaning.  Searle implicitly connects semantics with intentionality, a feature of 
‘mental states’ (Searle, 1980, p.424) or human consciousness, which could include direct 
engagement with meaning.  Ordinary discourse would not be contradiction in with 
meaning as part of human consciousness, although the distinction of syntax from 
semantics is also used to differentiate levels of analysis.   
 
A particular form of direct human activity on meaning, the linking together of words 
which have dissimilar expressions but some commonality in meaning, can be revealed to 
be humanly simple but not automatically computable, in a classic sense.  Everyday 
activity can be exemplified by the utterance, Oranges and lemons say the Bells of St. 
Clements.  A human, including a human child, could give ostensive or linguistic evidence 
of understanding the meaning of oranges and lemons and the connection between them, 
by pointing to or naming other instances of the category, fruit.  The process of 
recognizing the meanings of the words, oranges and lemons, is self-evidently simple for a 
human to conduct, as recognition and connection can normally be made by children 
raised in a society with the specific spoken language.  Computationally, or mechanically 
or syntactically, we can only engage directly with the expression of the words.  The 
expressions, oranges and lemons, have extensive commonalities, in their existence as part 
of the lexicon of written English, and, further, in their derivation from a single alphabet 
and the arrangement of their constituent letters in accord with conventions for 
combination of letters into words within the English language lexicon.  They both 
exemplify and correspond to a sophisticated understanding of the word of printed 
English, which embodies a rigorous focus on the level of expression, as ‘a cohesive group 
of letters with strong internal statistical influences’ (Shannon, 1951/1993 pp.197–198).  
However, their very commonality implies that they do not offer elements distinctive to 
the particular expressions which can separate them from other words of printed English 
and which would be amenable to automatic mechanical or computational detection, in the 
classic sense of a general process for determining the presence of the desired 
characteristic (Turing, 1936-1937/2004). As such, detecting a common meaning is non-
computable.  Recognition of commonality of meaning between two dissimilar 
expressions, drawn from a common lexicon, has then been revealed to be non-
computable under certain conditions.  We have then identified a form of everyday 
activity which is humanly simple as a semantic process but resistant to computation. 
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The fundamental aim for compilations, of collocating common or related meanings, 
irrespective of their particular form of expression in the language of discourse, can 
involve syntactic procedures or direct engagement with meaning, and in some instances, 
may necessitate direct engagement with meaning.  Related meanings with syntactically 
similar expressions—for instance, lemon, lemons, and lemony—could be collocated 
either by considerations of meaning or by syntactic computational transformations.  
Related meanings with strongly different expressions may require direct human 
engagement with meaning, if they are to be linked or collocated.  For instance, to give a 
fictional example, Raymond Chandler, Dashiell Hammett, and William Faulkner, 
understood as the names of writers associated with a particular genre of film, could all be 
gathered under the generic term, Film noir, but such a collocation would require direct 
human engagement with meaning and could not be produced by mechanical or syntactic 
procedures, in the classic sense.  A crucial potential value for human activity on meaning 
for compilations which is not immediately realizable mechanically or computationally—
the gathering together of items related in meaning but dissimilar in pattern—has then 
been isolated.  We have then definitively begun to illustrate and isolate direct human 
activity on meaning, distinctive from syntactic procedures, as it could be manifested for 
compilations. 
 
The potential value for human activity on meaning of compilations has been partly 
deductively derived, from an understanding of the constraints on computational 
processes, but it can be inductively supported, from real world practices on data for 
compilations.  Linking together terms related in meaning but contrasting in pattern would 
form a substantial part of classic relations for compilations: from genus to species (for 
instance, fruit to lemon), of broader term to narrower term, and term to related term, in 
thesauri, and see and see also cross references in indexes.  Human activity for databases 
has substantial costs (Hayes, 2000) and may have value not obtainable from mechanical 
procedures.  Value, as perceived by consumers of compilations, can be evidenced by a 
continuing market for particular compilations (Swanson, 1980).  Markets for the costly 
activity of linking syntactically different, but semantically related, terms together 
continue to exist, within such disparate compilations as library catalogues and e-Bay.  
Oranges and lemons, if made available for sale on e-Bay, could be covered by the, 
possibly fictional, generic term and category, fruit.  We have then obtained very strong 
inductive support for a partly deductively derived argument, from practical 
developments. 
 
In summary, then, meaning as direct human activity motivated by meaning can include a 
form of activity, the association of syntactically strongly different but semantically 
related expressions, which is distinctively not mechanical, in the specific sense of not 
being immediately amenable to automatic computation.  Such activity can be humanly 
simple and is significantly realized for compilations.  The idea of meaning as direct 
human engagement with meaning has not been in contradiction with meaning as a level 
of analysis, but complementary and enabling fuller development of the not mechanical, 
providing the least and sharpest difference from an automatic mechanical procedure. 
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Direct engagement with meaning and classic concepts of creativity 
 
The linking of disparate things together to form a cohesive whole is central to high levels 
of creativity, on classic and widely diffused understandings of creativity.  The 18
th
 
century Italian philosopher, Giambattista Vico, understood the human faculty for 
ingenuity, which would include creativity, in this fashion. 
 
‘The power of ingenuity  ... consists in the reciprocal joining of diverse things. … Indeed, in an 
acute saying, these three features are founds – the things (res), the words (verba), and the 
joining or tying (ligament) of things and words. … acumen consists in a rare and new aptness 
of two extremes happily joined in a certain saying.’ (Vico, 1811/1996, pp.125-126)  
 
The joining together of diverse things as highly creative is traced to at least Aristotle’s 
Rhetoric. 
 
‘only creative and acute philosophers are capable of finding in things far removed from each 
other that similarity which can be contemplated.’ (Vico, 1811/1996, pp.125-126)  
 
A significant 20
th
 century statement of synthesis and amalgamation as central to creativity 
can be found in T.S. Eliot’s conception of the poet’s mind. 
 
‘When a poet’s mind is perfectly equipped for its work, it is constantly amalgamating disparate 
experience … falls in love or reads Spinoza … the noise of the typewriter or the smell of 
cooking; in the mind of the poet these experiences are always forming new wholes.’ (Eliot, 
1921/1950, p.247) 
 
In information science, creativity has been understood as the making of unprecedented 
connections between public knowledge, although it has been primarily computationally 
modelled rather than conceived as human activity directly motivated by meaning 
(Swanson, 1986).  The notion of a knight’s move, the discovery of previously 
unarticulated connections, can be found in ordinary discourse.  A concept of high levels 
of creativity, consistent with and continuous from creativity as human activity on 
meaning, is, then, historically well established and also sustained in modern discourse, 
including information science and ordinary discourse. 
 
An example can be given which combines the procedures of selection, coordination, and 
arrangement, as understood to be involved in compilations, from the perspective of 
copyright, with very high levels of creativity.  Written English could be conceived for 
analytical purposes, as a lexicon of words, broadly corresponding to a monolingual 
dictionary.  A rhetorical task could then be conceived of taking the names of the twelve 
calendar months, selecting seventeen words from the lexicon, and coordinating and the 
names of the months and the words, with normal punctuation marks, to produce an 
interesting utterance.  Very high, and extremely rare, levels of creativity are exhibited in 
the following utterance. 
 
‘October. This is one of the peculiarly dangerous months to speculate in stocks in. The others 
are July, January, September, April, November, May, March, June, December, August, and 
February. – Pudd’nhead Wilson’s Calendar’ (Twain, 1894/1969, p.177) 
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The interest of the utterance is evidenced by the continuing market for the work in which 
it is included, Pudd’nhead Wilson (Twain, 1894/1969), and the rarity of such creativity 
by the limited survival in current markets of works from the late 19
th
 century.  The 
passage obtains some of its effect from the contrast of the reversals and gaps in 
chronological order— ‘June, December, August’ (p.177)—with the customary 
chronological sequence of the months, which could be syntactically generated, as well as 
from the contradiction between the meaning of ‘peculiarly dangerous’ (p.177) and the 
exhaustive listing of the twelve months.  A specific example has then been added to 
theory. 
 
Creativity, including the highest levels of creativity, can then smoothly and progressively 
emerge within the not mechanical.  The possibility of novelty contained within such high 
levels of creativity corresponds to the specific implications of the antithetical clause, 
‘nothing remotely creative’ (Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service Co., Inc., 1991, 
p.363), that the fully creative should be not ‘dictated by state law’ nor ‘an age-old 
practice, firmly rooted in tradition and so commonplace that it has come to be expected as 
a matter of course … practically inevitable … time-honored tradition’ (pp.362–363).  The 
conception of creativity has then been extended to encompass the fully creative. 
 
Creativity 
 
The inclusion of novelty in the fully creative also implies a contrast with the ‘so … 
routine’, enabling a fuller understanding of the relation of creativity to the not 
mechanical.  Routinicity in the process is explicitly designated as ‘so … routine’ and can 
also be revealed by being embodied in the product, as ‘entirely typical’ or ‘garden-
variety’, both for processes designated as ‘so … routine’ (Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural 
Tel. Service Co., Inc., 1991, p.362), and those not so designated.  Within the not 
mechanical, and reading upwards (see Table 2) <Insert Table 2 here >, where routinicity 
is present in both process and product, the compilation is not creative.  Where the process 
is ‘so … routine’ (p.362) but routinicity is not revealed in the product, the compilation is 
creative and can be understood to have the slightest trace of creativity.  Where ‘so … 
routine’ (p.362) is not designated for the process and routinicity is increasingly less 
marked in the product, the process can be understood to reach higher levels of creativity.  
Where routinicity is not marked at all in the process or present in the product, the process 
can be understood as fully creative, for both the highest placed combination and the 
interleaved combination regarded as analogous to it.  The not mechanical remains 
substantively invariant within creativity, across all the transitions in levels of routinicity.  
We can then understand not mechanical activity on meaning as becoming creative, first at 
a transitional level and then fully creative, after it has passed certain levels of routinicity 
(see Table 2).   
 
The understanding of creativity meets all the conditions for creativity derived from the 
decision.  The negation of the antithesis to creativity indicates that creativity begins 
immediately after the absence of creativity, at a transitional level corresponding to the 
level of creativity required for the ‘creative spark ... so trivial as to be virtually 
nonexistent’ (Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service Co., Inc., 1991, p.359).  The 
smooth movement between transitional and very high levels of creativity means that 
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creativity necessarily includes the ‘extremely low’ (p.345), but more than ‘so trivial’ 
(p.359), level of creativity required for a minimal degree of creativity.  Creativity can be 
read from the end product as something not devoid of the slightest trace of creativity, in a 
mode of reading warranted by the reading of the absence of creativity established by the 
opinion, as ‘devoid of even the slightest trace of creativity’ (Feist Publications, Inc. v. 
Rural Tel. Service Co., Inc., 1991, p.362).  Creativity is then knowable on the model of 
the treatment of the absence of creativity within the opinion.  The connection to classic 
discourse about creativity gave it some connections with ordinary discourse and idea of 
creativity as constituted by a departure from routinicity, within the not mechanical, would 
be consistent with ordinary discourse.  Creativity as involving direct engagement with 
meaning is also prima facie applicable to works other than compilations and the inclusion 
of all possible levels of creativity renders it fully applicable to all works.  Creativity then 
occupies all required levels, is knowable on the given model, has a strong consistency 
with ordinary discourse, and is applicable to all works. 
 
The formulation for creativity, that,  A compilation has the slightest trace of creativity if, 
and only if, it is not an entirely typical or garden-variety end product constructed by an 
automatic mechanical procedure or a so … routine process, can then be transformed.  
The inclusion of the highest possible levels of creativity enables the replacement of the 
slightest trace of creativity by creative (is is substituted for has the as an acceptable 
simplification for the embodiment of creativity in the product).  The applicability of 
creativity to all works legitimates the replacement of compilation by work.  The 
transformed formulation then reads. 
 
A work is creative if, and only if, it is not an entirely typical or garden-variety end product 
constructed by an automatic mechanical procedure or a so … routine process. 
 
A minimal degree of creativity and originality 
 
The understanding of creativity can be further validated by integrating creativity, 
understood as human activity on meaning above a certain level of routinicity, primarily 
into a minimal degree of creativity but also into the creative spark ‘so trivial as to be 
virtually nonexistent’ (Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service Co., Inc., 1991, 
p.359), with a minimal degree of creativity and independent creation integrated into 
originality. 
 
The ‘creative spark ... so trivial as to be virtually nonexistent’ (Feist Publications, Inc. v. 
Rural Tel. Service Co., Inc., 1991, p.359) was understood as a real level and amount of 
creativity below the level required for a minimal degree.  The characterization of the 
‘insufficient creativity’ ‘expended’ by Rural—‘could not be more obvious ... the most 
basic information’ (pp.362-363) — is consistent with the understanding developed of 
creativity as human activity on meaning.  The creative spark ‘so trivial as to be virtually 
nonexistent’ (p.359) was later matched by a reference to, ‘a de minimis quantum of 
creativity’ (p.363).  [Q]uantum’ (p.363) can be understood as an irreducible unit, between 
the level required for a minimal degree and the absence of creativity.  ‘[D]e minimis’ 
(p.362) can be understood in both its ordinary sense of, of the least, and its more technical 
legal sense, of below legal significance.  The ordinary and legal sense of de minimis 
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potentially coincide, in their reference to a quantum as an irreducible unit—the 
formulation ‘so trivial as to be virtually nonexistent’ (p.59) is acceptable as an ordinary 
discourse characterization of a unit below the ‘extremely low’ (p.345) level required for a 
minimal degree of creativity and in the legal sense of de minimis. 
 
The level of creativity required for a minimal degree can then be elucidated.  
Contrastively, and in accord with the internal dynamics of the decision, it can be 
understood as ‘more than a de minimis quantum’ (Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. 
Service Co., Inc., 1991, p.363). ‘[M]ore than’ (p.363) must be understood as indicating a 
Euclidean line, without significant breadth, separating the level required for a minimal 
degree of creativity from a de minimis quantum, to bring the meaning of ‘more than’ 
(p.363) into accord with the implications of ‘there remains’ (p.359) in, ‘[t]here remains a 
narrow category of works in which the creative spark is … so trivial as to be virtually 
nonexistent’ (p.359).  The level of creativity required for a minimal degree can be further 
understood as ‘intellectual’, from other opinions endorsed within the decision, in which 
‘intellectual’ (pp.346, 347, 362) is the only term directly connected to a minimal degree 
of creativity which can denote a level.  Intellectual can be extrapolated to include skills 
requiring specialized training, from a classic passage in Supreme Court judgment 
explicitly endorsed within the decision (p.359). 
 
‘The amount of training required for humbler efforts than those before us is well indicated by 
Ruskin. ‘If any young person, after being taught what is, in polite circles, called ‘drawing,’ will 
try to copy the commonest piece of real work,-suppose a lithograph on the title page of a new 
opera air, or a woodcut in the cheapest illustrated newspaper of the day,-they will find 
themselves entirely beaten.’ Elements of Drawing, first ed. 3.’’ (Bleistein, 1903) 
 
An intellectual or specialized level is consistent with ‘more than a de minimis quantum’ 
(Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service Co., Inc., 1991, p.363).  Such a level can be 
read from the work, including a compilation, as an end product, or, failing that, from an 
enquiry into the circumstances of production in which the elements of the work in which 
copyright is claimed were created.   
 
The combination of level and amount of creativity sufficient for a minimal degree is 
explicitly indicated in the opinion, first directly and ostensively. 
 
‘if the compilation author clothes facts with an original collocation of words, he or she may be 
able to claim a copyright in this written expression.  Others may copy the underlying facts from 
the publication, but not the precise words used to present them. In Harper & Row, for example, 
we explained that President Ford could not prevent others from copying bare historical facts 
from his autobiography, but that he could prevent others from copying his ‘subjective 
descriptions and portraits of public figures’.’ (Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service Co., 
Inc., 1991, p.348) 
 
The precise words, understood to be a product of President Ford’s creative activity at an 
intellectual level, correspond to the combination of the level required and the amount of 
creativity sufficient for a minimal degree of creativity.  The formulations, ‘an original 
collocation of words’, and, more intensely, ‘the precise words’ (p.348), imply a definite 
order of words.  The number of precise words then corresponds to a sufficient amount of 
creativity at the requisite level.  Short (less than ten, for instance) sequences are known to 
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be likely to be distinctive, even in very large corpora, from experience of using large 
collections of text searchable by phrase searching.  The distinctiveness of such sequences 
is also theoretically explicable, from the understanding of the word as ‘a cohesive group 
of letters with strong internal statistical influences’ (Shannon, 1951/1993 pp.197–198).  A 
sequence of words would then be a weakly statistically correlated linear concatenation of 
internally cohesive units.  A sufficient amount of creativity, for compilations and other 
works with added written expression, can then definitively be read directly from the 
product, from a sufficient number of consecutive words.     
 
The decision then indicates how this amount of creativity, is to be embodied in the 
process of creating compilations, without ‘an original collocation of words’ (Feist 
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service Co., Inc., 1991, p.349) . 
 
‘Where the compilation author adds no written expression but rather lets the facts speak for 
themselves, the expressive element is more elusive. The only conceivable expression is the 
manner in which the compiler has selected and arranged the facts.’ (Feist Publications, Inc. v. 
Rural Tel. Service Co., Inc., 1991, p.349) 
 
The amount of creativity for compilations without additional written expression cannot be 
directly read from the number of consecutive words. 
 
The equivalence to the amount of creativity in the precise words can be discerned, from 
an exchange value perspective.  Amounts of creativity at the required, and common, level 
can be understood as equivalent, when they can be fairly exchanged for each other, 
drawing on a deep sense of exchange value.  The amount of creativity embodied in the 
precise words can be understood to be represented by the exchange, or monetary, values 
connected with them, from a related and surface, although not superficial, sense of 
exchange value.  An equivalent amount of creativity embodied in compilations without 
additional written expression can then be understood to be similarly represented by 
exchange or monetary values closely comparable to those connected with the precise 
words.  Such an understanding of amount is also consistent with a minimal degree of 
creativity as ‘more than a de minimis quantum of creativity’ (Feist Publications, Inc. v. 
Rural Tel. Service Co., Inc., 1991, p.363).  Quantum is still understood as an irreducible 
unit, continuous with its previous interpretation, but with reference to amount rather than 
to level, and de minimis can be restricted to its specialized sense, of below legal 
significance.  The amount of creativity required, for both compilations with and without 
additional written expression, can then be understood to be indicated by more than a de 
minimis quantum of exchange values connected with the product and arising from 
creative activity at or above the required level. 
 
A humanly created bibliographic record then emerges as one possible correlate to, or, at 
least, constituent of, the combination of level required and amount sufficient for a 
minimal degree of creativity.  The level of creativity involved in compilations can be 
understood as intellectual—independent references to the ‘intellectual labor of cataloging 
and indexing’ (Wilson, 2001, p.203) can be found—and also to require specialized 
training.  The combination of level and amount of creativity embodied in a bibliographic 
record has been connected with certain exchange and monetary values. 
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‘Any proper accounting would assign a cost of at least $30 to the work in creating just one of 
those records [for OCLC WorldCat].’ (Hayes, 2000, p.76). 
 
The cost indicated would correspond or readily aggregate to more than a de minimis 
quantum of exchange values, in the legal sense of de minimis.  Other correlates would 
then include semantically transformed indexes or other records constructed by human 
intellectual or specialized activity.   
 
The level of creativity required and the amount sufficient for a minimal degree of 
creativity can be connected to the understanding of creativity previously established.  The 
absence of routinicity from both the process and the product for the fully creative admits 
an intellectual level and indicates a sufficient amount, for both the highest placed and the 
interleaved combination for creativity (see Table 3 first row) <Insert Table 3 here >.  The 
fully creative could then correspond to a minimal degree of creativity.  For the creative 
(see Table 3 second to fourth rows), the level of creativity is increasingly unlikely 
(reading downwards from the second to the fourth row in Table 3) to be intellectual if the 
routinicity in the product implies routinicity in the process.  The level of creativity could 
be intellectual if the routinicity in the product is exclusively to do with amount, without 
implications for the process, but the amount would then be insufficient for a minimal 
degree of creativity.  The creative, then, is either below the required level or insufficient 
in amount for a minimal degree of creativity.  The routinicity designated in the process 
and revealed in the product for the slightest trace of creativity  (see Table 3 fifth  row) 
renders it a priori unlikely to be intellectual in level.  It is then necessarily below the 
required level for a minimal degree of creativity.  Both the creative and the slightest trace 
of creativity correspond to a de minimis quantum of creativity, either by level or by 
amount or both.   Only the fully creative can then correspond to a minimal degree of 
creativity. 
 
The relation of the two interleaved combinations for creativity to the overall argument 
can be clarified (see Table 3).  The first, understood as not mechanical activity in the 
construction of a significant and not so … routine automatic mechanical procedure 
admits an intellectual and specialized level and a sufficiency of amount of creativity, in 
addition to the common activity on meaning already identified.  The level and amount of 
creativity can also be indicated by its exchange value.  The analogy with the highest 
placed combination for creativity is then confirmed.  The second, with a ‘so mechanical 
or routine’ Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service Co., Inc., 1991, p.362), process 
necessarily falls below an intellectual level and can be definitively excluded from a 
minimal degree of creativity.  The discounting of the combination, previously 
provisionally made for creativity, is then rendered unnecessary and can be replaced by a 
definitive placing out of relevant scope in relation to a minimal degree of creativity.  The 
possible disturbance to the argument has not then been realized and the integrity of the 
analysis has been sustained.  The fully creative is confirmed as potentially corresponding 
to a minimal degree of creativity, for all the combinations. 
 
The conditions for a minimal degree of creativity derived from the decision can be 
recalled.  It was required to have a level and for that level to be knowable, from its 
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specification as part of a test for originality.  Creativity at the required level must also 
give rise to amount significant for copyrightability and amount should be discernible.  
The identification of the level required as intellectual, and as readable from the product or 
by an enquiry into its conditions of production, fulfils the requirement for a testable, or 
sufficiently knowable to be testable, level.  The possibility of determining the sufficiency 
of amount, from the exchange values connected with the combination of level and 
amount in the end product, renders amount discernible.  A minimal degree of creativity, 
as realized in compilations, is then itself discernible.  The understanding of a minimal 
degree of creativity then meets all the conditions derived from the decision and is thereby 
sufficient. 
 
The relation of independent creation, the other constituent of originality, to a minimal 
degree of creativity can then be understood as, who originated the elements of the work 
with a minimal degree of creativity.  In the decision, this is signaled by the ‘to’ in ‘not 
original to Rural’ (Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service Co., Inc., 1991, p.363). 
 
‘We conclude that the names, towns, and telephone numbers copied by Feist were not original 
to Rural’ (p.363) [emphasis added] (Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service Co., Inc., 
1991, p.363) 
 
The understanding of the relation of independent creation to creativity is then consistent 
with its development within the decision. 
 
Originality, understood as solely constituted by a minimal degree of creativity and 
independent creation, is then discernible from a more than a de minimis quantum of 
exchange values arising from creative activity at, or above, the requisite level.  A 
discriminatory process for determining originality for compilations can be specified.  The 
existence of the required level of creativity can be tested by two consecutive 
discriminations. 
 
 Are there elements of the work not produced by an automatic mechanical 
procedure? 
 Do those elements embody creativity at the required intellectual level? 
 
The sufficiency of the amount of creativity can then be determined. 
 
 Do the elements at the required level embody a sufficient amount of creativity? 
 
(The process of discrimination can be followed through Table 3.)  Independent creation 
can then be determined, if a minimal degree of creativity exists. 
 
 Who originated the elements of the work with a minimal degree of creativity? 
 
Each discriminatory step takes the outcome of the previous discriminations, as its 
exclusive object. 
 
  creativity for feist  21 
 
In summary, then, we have progressively integrated creativity into a minimal degree of 
creativity and into originality.  The potential for creativity to have amount has been 
revealed.  We have then further validated the understanding of creativity developed. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The argument has had certain characteristics to commend it. 
 
In relation to the decision, the exhaustive identification of references to a minimal degree 
of creativity and to the creative spark below the level of creativity required for originality, 
demonstrated to contain the totality of consideration of creativity in the direct text of the 
decision, is indicative of comprehensiveness.  References to the creative spark below the 
level for originality were then fully distributed between creativity ‘utterly lacking’ and 
‘so trivial as to be virtually nonexistent’ (Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service 
Co., Inc., 1991, p.359), demonstrating a full depth of analysis.  Creativity was 
substantiated but not over-populated, in accord with negative approach to its delimitation 
in the judgment.  The treatment of an automatic mechanical procedure as the primary 
element of the creativity ‘utterly lacking’ (p.359) corresponds to the priority accorded to 
‘so mechanical’ (p.362) within the opinion.  The order of discrimination for originality 
for compilations embodied the relative priority given to each element in the decision, 
from ‘so mechanical’ (p.362), through a further level and then an amount of creativity, to 
independent creation.  These elements of parallelism between the argument and decision 
are suggestive of the appropriateness of the argument to its object, the decision. 
Comprehensiveness indicates that the relevant substantive elements of the decision have 
been fully captured and parallelism suggests the capture of its approach. 
 
The argument has also had substantive and formal characteristics generally considered 
desirable.  Substantive distinctions, for instance of meaning from syntactic processes, are 
accepted as founding assumptions in the disciplines from which they were derived and 
are also present in ordinary discourse.  The substitution of a correlated external standard 
to yield a conceptual gain of greater intersubjectivity is also a classic process of legal 
advance.  Formally, the central components of the argument consisted only of the 
correlation and a major inferential step, of negation, revealing economy.  Each 
subsequent step, from an automatic mechanical procedure to the not mechanical, from the 
not mechanical to meaning, from meaning to direct engagement with meaning, and from 
direct engagement with meaning to classic concepts of creativity, took the outcome of the 
previous stage as its basis, indicating a sequential argument connected as single chain.  
The descent from originality to creativity, and the subsequent ascent, could also be 
graphically represented, by a single diagram, revealing a strong degree of symmetry.  
Within the central and nonsymmetrical portion of that argument, creativity was 
progressively developed from a transitional to the very highest level.  Deep rooting in 
relevant discourses, economy, sequentiality, symmetry, and progressiveness are often 
taken to indicate valid arguments, if their object has been fully comprehended. 
 
In this instance, these qualities have been combined with a full capture of the decision. 
We can then regard the understanding of creativity as human action motivated by 
meaning, above a certain level of routinicity, as very strongly proven.   
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Figure 1. The meaning of originality. 
 
Original 
 
 
At least some minimal 
degree of creativity. 
 
Independently created by 
the author 
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Note.  The references to independent creation are given in bold and the primary evidence for their 
assimilation in italics. 
 
Figure 2. References to independent creation. 
Original, as the term is used in copyright, means only that the work was 
independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from 
other works) (p.345) 
 
originality requires independent creation (p.346) 
 
These choices as to selection and arrangement, so long as they are 
made independently by the compiler and entail a minimal degree of 
creativity, are sufficiently original that Congress may protect such 
compilations through the copyright laws. (p.348) 
 
Under the doctrine [of sweat of the brow], the only defense to 
infringement was independent creation. (p.353) 
 
Originality requires only that the author make the selection or 
arrangement independently (i.e., without copying that selection or 
arrangement from another work) (p.358) 
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Note.  The initial reference to the at least some minimal degree of creativity required for copyrightability 
is followed by further references which can be assimilated to it.  They can be identified from their 
connection to the initial reference (Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service Co., Inc., 1991a, p.345), and 
their linking to originality (pp.345, 346, 348), to the Constitution (pp.362-363), and to copyrightable 
expression (p.362). 
 
The references which can be assimilated to a minimal degree of creativity are given in bold and the 
primary evidence for their assimilation in italics. 
 
 
Figure 3. References which can be assimilated to a minimal degree of creativity. 
Original, as the term is used in copyright, means only … that it [the 
work] possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity.  … The vast 
majority of works make the grade quite easily, as they possess some 
creative spark. (p.345) 
 
The Court explained that originality requires … a modicum of creativity 
(p.346) 
 
the Court emphasized the creative component of originality (p.346). 
 
so long as they … entail a minimal degree of creativity, are sufficiently 
original (p.348) 
 
Originality requires … some minimal level of creativity. (p.358) 
 
the Constitution mandates some minimal degree of creativity (p.362) 
 
the modicum of creativity necessary to transform mere selection into 
copyrightable expression. (p.362)  
 
the minimal creative spark required by the Copyright Act and the 
Constitution. (p.363) 
 
As a constitutional matter, copyright protects … more than a de minimis 
quantum of creativity. (p.363) 
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Note. Bold is used for terms and phrases directly derived from the decision. 
 
Figure 4. Originality, at least some minimal degree of creativity, independent creation, and 
creativity. 
 
 
Original 
 
 
At least some minimal 
degree of creativity. 
 
Independently created by 
the author 
 
        Creativity 
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Note.  Further  references to the creative spark without the level required for originality are identifiable 
from their direct connection with Rural’s activities in construction of the directory or the directory itself 
(Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service Co., Inc., 1991a, pp.362-363), given that Rural’s white pages 
fall below the level of creativity required for originality (p.363).   
 
The references to the creative spark are given in bold and the primary evidence for their reference in 
italics. 
 
Figure 5. References to the creative spark utterly lacking or so trivial as to be virtually 
nonexistent. 
Originality requires that … it [the work] display some minimal level of 
creativity.  … the vast majority of compilations will pass this test, but not 
all will.  There remains a narrow category of works in which the creative 
spark is utterly lacking or so trivial as to be virtually nonexistent. … 
Such works are incapable of sustaining a valid copyright. (pp.358-359) 
 
The question that remains is whether Rural selected, coordinated, or 
arranged these uncopyrightable facts in an original way.  The selection 
and arrangement of facts cannot be so mechanical or routine as to 
require no creativity whatsoever (p.362)  
 
Rural’s white pages are entirely typical … [t]he end product is a garden-
variety white pages directory, devoid of even the slightest trace of 
creativity (p.363). 
 
Rural expended … insufficient creativity (pp.362-363) 
 
The white pages do nothing more than list Rural’s subscribers in 
alphabetical order … there is nothing remotely creative about 
arranging names alphabetically in a white pages directory. (p.363) 
 
a de minimis quantum of creativity.  Rurals’ white pages … fall short of 
the mark. (p.363). 
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Note.  The reference to the creative spark utterly lacking or so trivial as to be nonexistent is given in 
bold and the references to the creative spark utterly lacking and to the creative spark so trivial as to 
be virtually nonexistent in bold italics. 
 
Figure 6. The creative spark utterly lacking and so trivial as to be virtually nonexistent.
a narrow category of works in which the creative spark is utterly 
lacking or so trivial as to be virtually nonexistent. … Such works are 
incapable of sustaining a valid copyright. (pp.358-359) 
 
The question that remains is whether Rural selected, coordinated, or 
arranged these uncopyrightable faces in an original way.  The 
selection and arrangement of facts cannot be so mechanical or 
routine as to require no creativity whatsoever (p.362)  
 
Rural’s white pages are entirely typical … [t]he end product is a 
garden-variety white pages directory, devoid of even the slightest 
trace of creativity (p.363). 
 
Rural expended … insufficient creativity (pp.362-363) 
 
The white pages do nothing more than list Rural’s subscribers in 
alphabetical order …  there is nothing remotely creative about 
arranging names alphabetically in a white pages directory. (p.363) 
 
a de minimis quantum of creativity.  Rurals’ white pages … fall short 
of the mark. (p.363). 
 
Creative spark utterly lacking or so trivial as to be virtually 
nonexistent 
the creative spark … so trivial as to be virtually 
nonexistent. … Such works are incapable of 
sustaining a valid copyright. (pp.358-359) 
 
Rural expended … insufficient creativity (pp.362-363) 
 
a de minimis quantum of creativity.  Rurals’ white 
pages … fall short of the mark. (p.363). 
 
Creative spark so trivial as to be virtually 
nonexistent 
the creative spark … utterly lacking … Such works 
are incapable of sustaining a valid copyright. (pp.358-
359) 
 
The question that remains is whether Rural selected, 
coordinated, or arranged these uncopyrightable 
faces in an original way.  The selection and 
arrangement of facts cannot be so mechanical or 
routine as to require no creativity whatsoever 
(p.362)  
 
Rural’s white pages are entirely typical … [t]he end 
product is a garden-variety white pages directory, 
devoid of even the slightest trace of creativity 
(p.363). 
 
The white pages do nothing more than list Rural’s 
subscribers in alphabetical order …  there is nothing 
remotely creative about arranging names 
alphabetically in a white pages directory. (p.363) 
 
Creative spark utterly lacking  
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Note. Bold is used for terms and phrases directly derived from the decision. 
 
Figure 7. Originality, at least some minimal degree of creativity, independent creation, the creative spark utterly lacking or so trivial as to be 
virtually nonexistent, and creativity.
 
Original 
 
 
some minimal degree of 
creativity. 
 
Independently created by 
the author 
 
        Creativity 
the creative spark [is] 
utterly lacking or so 
trivial as to be 
virtually nonexistent. 
 
the creative spark … 
so trivial as to be 
virtually nonexistent. 
 
the creative spark … 
utterly lacking  
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Note.  References are given in bold and the primary evidence for the reference in italics.  
 
Figure 8.  All references to at least some minimal degree of creativity, the creative spark utterly 
lacking or so trivial as to be virtually nonexistent, and to creativity in the direct text of the 
decision. 
Original, as the term is used in copyright, means only … that it [the 
work] possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity.  … The vast 
majority of works make the grade quite easily, as they possess some 
creative spark. (p.345) 
 
The Court explained that originality requires … a modicum of creativity 
(p.346) 
 
the Court emphasized the creative component of originality (p.346). 
 
so long as they … entail a minimal degree of creativity, are sufficiently 
original (p.348) 
 
Originality requires … some minimal level of creativity. (p.358) 
 
the Constitution mandates some minimal degree of creativity (p.362) 
 
the modicum of creativity necessary to transform mere selection into 
copyrightable expression. (p.362)  
 
the minimal creative spark required by the Copyright Act and the 
Constitution. (p.363) 
 
As a constitutional matter, copyright protects … more than a de minimis 
quantum of creativity. (p.363) 
 
A minimal degree of creativity 
Original, as the term is used in copyright, means 
only … that it [the work] possesses at least some 
minimal degree of creativity.  … The vast majority 
of works make the grade quite easily, as they 
possess some creative spark. (p.345) 
 
The Court explained that originality requires … a 
modicum of creativity (p.346) 
 
the Court emphasized the creative component of 
originality (p.346). 
 
These choices as to selection and arrangement, so 
long as they … entail a minimal degree of creativity, 
are sufficiently original (p.348) 
 
Originality requires … some minimal level of 
creativity. (p.358)   
 
a narrow category of works in which the creative 
spark is utterly lacking or so trivial as to be 
virtually nonexistent. (pp.358-359) 
 
no creativity whatsoever (p.362)  
 
the Constitution mandates some minimal degree of 
creativity (p.362) 
 
devoid of even the slightest trace of creativity  
 
the modicum of creativity necessary to transform 
mere selection into copyrightable expression. 
(p.362)  
 
insufficient creativity (p.363) 
 
nothing remotely creative (p.363) 
 
the minimal creative spark required by the 
Copyright Act and the Constitution.’ (p.363) 
 
As a constitutional matter, copyright protects … 
more than a de minimis quantum of creativity. 
(p.363) 
 
All references to creativity 
a narrow category of works in which the creative spark is utterly 
lacking or so trivial as to be virtually nonexistent. … Such works are 
incapable of sustaining a valid copyright. (pp.358-359) 
 
The question that remains is whether Rural selected, coordinated, or 
arranged these uncopyrightable faces in an original way.  The selection 
and arrangement of facts cannot be so mechanical or routine as to 
require no creativity whatsoever (p.362)  
 
Rural’s white pages are entirely typical … [t]he end product is a garden-
variety white pages directory, devoid of even the slightest trace of 
creativity (p.363). 
 
Rural expended … insufficient creativity (pp.362-363) 
 
The white pages do nothing more than list Rural’s subscribers in 
alphabetical order …  there is nothing remotely creative about 
arranging names alphabetically in a white pages directory. (p.363) 
 
a de minimis quantum of creativity.  Rurals’ white pages … fall short of 
the mark. (p.363). 
 
Creative spark utterly lacking or so trivial as to be virtually 
nonexistent. 
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Process and 
product
automatic 
mechanical 
procedure
so ... routine
automatic 
mechanical 
procedure 
v so ...  
routine
entirely 
typical
garden-
variety
entirely 
typical v 
garden-
variety
(automatic 
mechanical 
procedure v so 
... routine) ^ 
(entirely typical v 
garden-variety)
FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE Creative
FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE Creative
FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE Creative
FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE Creative
FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE Creative
FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE not-creative
FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE not-creative
FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE not-creative
TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE Creative
A novel mechanical 
procedure.
TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE not-creative
TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE not-creative
TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE not-creative
TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE Creative
Tension betw een 
process and product.
TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE not-creative
TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE not-creative
TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE not-creative
Process
Creative or 
not-creative
Product
Note. The customary ordering for logical truth tables, from true to false, is reversed, to bring creativity to the upper levels of the ordering, 
in accord w ith the differentiation by levels of creativity w ithin the opinion.
Table 1. The creative and the not creative.
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Process and 
product
automatic 
mechanical 
procedure
so ... routine
automatic 
mechanical 
procedure 
v so ...  
routine
entirely 
typical
garden-
variety
entirely 
typical v 
garden-
variety
(automatic 
mechanical 
procedure v so ... 
routine) ^ (entirely 
typical v garden-
variety)
FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE Fully creative
Absence of  marked 
routinicity.
FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE Creative
FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE Creative
FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE Creative
FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
Slightest trace 
of creativity
FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE not-creative
FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE not-creative
FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE not-creative
TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE Fully creative
Absence of  marked 
routinicity.
TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE not-creative
TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE not-creative
TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE not-creative
TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE Creative
Tension betw een 
process and product.
TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE not-creative
TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE not-creative
TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE not-creative
Table 2. Creativity 
Process
Creative or 
not-creative
Product
Not 
mechanical 
Decreasingly 'so ... 
routine' as revealed in 
the product.
Decreasing levels of 
routinicity in the 
process as revealed 
in the product.
Routinicity
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Process and 
product
Originality
automatic 
mechanical 
procedure
so ... routine
automatic 
mechanical 
procedure v 
so ...  
routine
entirely 
typical
garden-
variety
entirely 
typical ... 
garden-
variety
(automatic 
mechanical 
procedure v so ... 
routine) ^ (entirely 
typical v garden-
variety)
Requisite 
level of 
creativity.
Requisite 
level and 
suff icient 
amount of 
creativity.
A minimal 
degree of 
creativity,  a 
de minimis 
quantum of 
creativity, or 
not creative.
Original
FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE Fully creative Potentially Potentially Potentially
FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE Creative
FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE Creative
FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE Creative
FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
Slightest trace 
of creativity
Not NA
FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE not-creative not-creative not-creative not-creative
FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE not-creative not-creative not-creative not-creative
FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE not-creative not-creative not-creative not-creative
TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE Fully creative Potentially Potentially Potentially Potentially
TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE not-creative not-creative not-creative not-creative
TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE not-creative not-creative not-creative not-creative
TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE not-creative not-creative not-creative not-creative
TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE Creative Not not-creative not-creative
TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE not-creative not-creative not-creative not-creative
TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE not-creative not-creative not-creative not-creative
TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE not-creative not-creative not-creative not-creative
Table 3. Creativity and a minimal degree of creativity.
Not original
Not original
A minimal degree of creativity
A de minimis 
quantum
Process
Creative or not-
creative
Product
Increasingly 
unlikely for 
level and 
amount.
Potentially
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1
  The difference between the noun, creativity, the adjective, creative, contains the possibility of a significant 
difference, in their meaning or in the inclusion of creativity.  However, a closely subsequent reference to the first 
reference to a ‘minimal degree of creativity’, ‘some creative spark’ (p.345), uses ‘creative’ as a term, implying an 
equivalence between creativity and creative, within a minimal degree of creativity.  The variation between 
‘creativity’ (pp.345, 346, 348, 362, 363) and ‘creative’ (pp.345, 346, 363) can, in this and every subsequent reference 
which can be assimilated to a minimal degree of creativity, be connected with the grammatical requirements of the 
surrounding phrase.  The possibility of a significant distinction is not, then, realized. 
 
2
  The pattern of occurrence of creativity and creative within the creative spark ‘utterly lacking or so trivial as to be 
virtually nonexistent’ (Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service Co., Inc., 1991, p.359) is similar to that within a 
minimal degree of creativity.  The variation between ‘creativity’ (pp. 358, 362, 363) and ‘creative’ (pp.359, 363) can 
be connected with grammatical requirements of the surrounding phrase, the difference is not semantically significant, 
and ‘creativity’ (pp. 358, 362, 363) occurs more frequently. 
 
